Co-Determination in Sweden: Functions for Boards with Employee Representatives by Garde, Hans Styrbjorn
HANS STYRBJORN GARDE*
Co-Determination in Sweden:
Functions for Boards with
Employee Representatives
The new Swedish law-which came in force on April 1, 1973-concerning
representation for employees of the boards of stock corporations etc., provides
for two board members (employee representatives) to be appointed by the
employees through their local trade unions. The law restricts the application to
enterprises employing an average of at least 100 employees and having had three
board members or more.
The law will focus attention on problems concerning the rules relating to the
functions of the board, and the individual responsibilities of the board
members. The law stipulates that the employee representatives have the same
rights and obligations as the other board members. The new board members
will thus not have a special status, which is astonishing considering the
completely different basic conditions for the appointment, and also the limited
scope of the actual functions, of employee representatives.
Within this article attention will be directed to the functions which the
board must carry out in order to fulfill the requirements of the law, which
information the board should make available, how the chairman shall carry out
his obligations, which provisions governing confidential information apply to
the board and its members, and finally the responsibility of the board members
in matters relating to these questions.
I. The Forms of Board Functions
The law does not provide for explicit requirements or detailed rules in this
respect. In practice there are considerable differences between very active
boards, and boards with their functions concentrated on only one annual
meeting, often combined with the general shareholders' meeting. One must
start with the tasks with which the board is entrusted under the Company Law,
i.e., the main rule that the administration of the company is a matter for the
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board with the exception of the day-to-day routine business which is carried out
by a general manager (GM).
This general function of the board is in some respects specified. Thus the
board must see to it that the company has a satisfactory organization, that the
GM fulfills his obligations and that instructions will be issued in relevant
instances to the GM and to other employees of the company; and further that
the board receives relevant information concerning the situation of the company
at suitable intervals and by suitable means. The control of accounting and the
use of funds is, in the last instance, a matter for the board.
The law presumes that the board fulfills its functions at board meetings at
which necessary decisions are made under the participation of the GM. The
scope of such board meetings is not specified in the law, nor is the number of
meetings. The forms of functions which shall be applied in individual cases have
been left open-for the board to decide. This could lead to the belief that no
organized board meetings need be held under the provisions of the Company
Law. Many companies would also seem to have applied the law in this manner.
It is obvious that the law has a different meaning. The law does not, however,
contain compulsory rules in order to secure the proper execution of the
functions of the board. Impliedly it is clear that a board that does not fulfill the
obligations mentioned in the law, cannot expect any sympathy from the
legislator. Thus the chairman of the board may not refuse to comply with a
request from a board member or of the GM for convening the board.
In order to comply with the duties provided for in the law, or which can be
inferred from the law, the board must itself decide which forms of functions it
shall apply. It is not possible to indicate any particular method for functioning,
since great differences prevail in different cases. The board must therefore take
into account the special circumstances in the individual enterprise, and on this
basis try to determine the optimum conditions for a satisfactory functioning of
the board. This includes among other things:
a. the evaluation of information to be continuously received by the board
from the management.
b. maintenance of a continual contact with the enterprise.
c. convening of the board in accordance with a special timetable which will
permit decision making in ordinary circumstances.
It must also be noted that the board must have the opportunity of making
quick decisions in extraordinary circumstances where any delay may endanger
its operations.
As a summary it is suggested that the board drafts a list of such matters which
might be of relevance to the board, and indicates a working routine for decision
making in these instances. This should include a determination as to the
information flow, its evaluation and decision making in ordinary circumstances.
In extraordinary circumstances-if such are conceivable-an emergency
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routine is set forth, and here the chairman has a prominent role.
H. The Functions of the Chairman of the Board
In the company law it is made clear that the chairman has a central position
only in the convening of the board. With this exception, the law has failed to
indicate any provisions concerning the functions which the chairman is to
exercise. From other provisions, e.g., concerning information from the
management to the board, it is possible to infer that the intention of the
legislator has been to accord the chairman a strong position, not only as the
head of the board, but also as a decision maker in matters of particular
importance, in which it is not possible to await a decision of a board meeting,
and where the board subsequently has to decide on the actions of the chairman
and the GM.
In practice the circumstances differ so greatly between different companies
that it is impossible to speak of a common attitude or principle, concerning the
functions of a board chairman. As the situation is now, the personal relations
between those corporate officials: GM-chairman-the board, are totally
decisive. A strong chairman will naturally assume many functions which in
other companies are exercised either by the GM or the board as a body.
The new law on employee representation will, to a greater extent than before,
focus the attention on the question of the functions and position of the chairman
of the board. Even the function of the chairman to convene the board will in the
future become more significant. In addition it can be stated that the chairman is
responsible for ensuring that the flow of information between board meetings
gives him sufficient opportunities continually to follow the development of the
company in its main lines, and to convene the board if any information received
by the chairman gives reason for assuming that decisions should be taken by the
board.
The chairman of the board will assume a much greater personal responsibility
in related circumstances. This responsibility might be particularly relevant
when the company is suffering losses or is subjected to extraordinary strains-
occasions in which one has the right to expect an intervention by the chairman
for decision making and for issuance of instructions to the management.
In the long run it seems unavoidable to lay down in the Company Law, clear
and detailed guidelines for the functions of the chairman covering at least
companies where employee representatives are appointed.
Ell. Information to the Board
In representing the board, the chairman has not only the right but also the
duty to ensure that the management supplies information necessary for the
board to fulfill its tasks. For the individual board member, however, no such
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right is prescribed. Accordingly, confidential information about the company
may not be obtained directly from the GM or other personnel in the company.
A board member who fails to obtain information requested from the GM may
refer the matter to the board, which then decides on whether such information
shall be released or not. Should the board uphold the GM's refusal to pass on
the requested information, the member of the board can not force it to be
released, but may only register his protest in the minutes of the meetings of the
board, or note the matter in the annual report, or appeal to the annual meeting
of the shareholders. Naturally it is always open to the board member in such a
case to resign if he believes that the board fails to function in accordance with
the provisions of the law.
When deciding what information the management shall make available, the
board could issue an instruction as to the release of pertinent information at
certain times. The instruction should mention whether other board members
than the chairman shall receive the information. The chairman has to gather
such information between board meetings, so that he will be able to inform the
board and prepare its decision-making.
At board meetings information in the form of financial reports etc., may be
handed over to board members on an individual basis. Nothing, however,
prohibits such information being made available only to the chairman, who
presents to the other board members what he considers to be necessary for
decision making. Considerations of secrecy may often be so important that the
information given to the board at meetings will be concentrated only to a few
important facets.
Normally financial reports, marketing analyses, manpower forecasts, etc., are
presented to the board members in an abbreviated form. In addition short and
long range investment plans are of great interest to the board, and should be
reported by the GM or the chairman to the extent it seems required for proper
decision making.
IV. Secrecy Rules
The board members' secrecy obligation is not directly prescribed in the
Company Law. Such an obligation may, however, be inferred from general rules
concerning agents, who act on behalf of a principal protecting the interests of
the principal, including a duty to preserve secrecy on his behalf concerning
circumstances which might damage the principal. Circumstances of this kind
may be defined by the board either in a general way, or in the board's manual,
or also from case to case. When in doubt, the board member should
immediately ask for the board's decision as to whether he may or may not
disclose to others, information he has received in his capacity of director.
Financial reports and other internal papers should not be shown to
unauthorized persons, with the exception of documents which already are
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available to the public, such as annual reports and audit reports to be presented
at the annual general meeting of shareholders.
If a director, on purpose or by negligence, commits a breach against the
secrecy obligation, by transferring secret information to unauthorized persons,
and it may be presumed that the director is aware of, or should have been aware
of, the danger of damage to the company-compensation for the damages the
company has suffered may be claimed. In certain cases, criminal action may be
taken against the violating board member.
Under these circumstances, it is of special importance to draw a clear line
between secret information which may not be disclosed outside the board of
directors, and other information. One method is to include in the manual or
instructions for the board of directors, a list of matters which normally fall
under the secrecy obligation.
If a matter is listed as secret there is a clear presumption against the board
member who is neglecting his duties, and thereby causing damage to the
company whose interests he should protect and promote.
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